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ABSTRACT
Designing a secure software system requires the ability to repre-
sent and reason about a wide variety of security concerns. Existing
modelling representations lack a comprehensive set of security
building blocks or lack support for composition or renement of
the design under consideration. We propose a new modular meta-
model for representing these security designs. This model supports
both composition for more complex solutions and representing
dierent levels of abstraction to model the underlying details. This
meta-model can subsequently be used for the construction of secu-
rity solutions, supporting a wide range of mechanisms on a wide
variety of abstraction levels, thereby providing a foundation for the
security-by-design approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With society’s growing reliance on technology, software systems
have become increasingly complex and their security has become
increasingly important to get right. The importance of properly
designed software is already recognized in software engineering for
a very long time [7]. Its equal importance with regard to security
is also gaining more attention recently with security extensions
for UML such as UMLsec [9] and several security design pattern
catalogues [5, 13].
In the software architecture domain, a widespread stance is that
security-relevant information of a software system should be cap-
tured in a view, which is composed of one or more models [3, 8].
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Such a (system-specic) view is an instance of a security viewpoint,
which prescribes the model kinds to use. A model kind species,
among others, the language and notation for the models, as well
as analysis methods and operations, and is typically backed by a
meta-model. The availability of a precise security view for a sys-
tem opens the door for extensive analysis activities to verify that
a design meets its security requirements. Besides modelling the
security of a concrete system, such a view can also serve as the basis
for describing security patterns and solutions, enabling a precise,
reusable, and unambiguous dissemination of them. To enable these
uses, a suitable underlying meta-model is required.
Unfortunately, for the security domain, such a generic meta-
model currently does not exist, causing the creation of a security
view to remain a dicult task. For example, the survey of van den
Berghe et al. [15] illustrated that many representations lack a com-
prehensive set of elements and only focus a single security concern.
Existing catalogues of security patterns further corroborate this, by
using custom or ad-hoc representations (e.g., variants of UML) that
are not always well-suited to express the solutions [5, 6, 12, 13].
Such ambiguous ad-hoc representations can cause misinterpreta-
tions or faulty instantiations of these security patterns and prohibits
easy comparison of multiply pattern alternatives.
A challenge when creating a security meta-model is that it needs
to support the creation of an integrated, comprehensive, and simul-
taneously in-depth view on software security. Issues in secure API
development illustrate the need for such a view. An example of this
is the XOR-To-Null-Key attack in a bank terminal API, discussed
by Anderson [1], which illustrates how the combination of secure
instructions can lead to insecurity. The meta-model should there-
fore provide modular support for a comprehensive set of security
building blocks and solutions, enable the modelling of complex
security-sensitive systems by composing partial solutions, allow
to rene the model to an arbitrary level of detail where necessary,
and enable reasoning about security attacks.
In this paper, we propose such a modular meta-model for se-
curity. It has been designed with the explicit intent of enabling
composition and allowing renement, and to serve as the foun-
dation of a security-by-design approach. Since space constraints
prevent us from providing and discussing all aspects and subtleties
of the proposed meta-model, we necessarily had to make a selection
of the concepts to present in this paper. But this selection does serve
as a good illustration of the expressiveness and modular support
for representing models in various abstraction levels.
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Figure 1: Structure of our meta-model
2 PROPOSED META-MODEL
In this section the proposed meta-model is elaborated upon. This
model is designed to adhere to the following principles.
Comprehensiveness. The meta-model should support expressing
a wide range of varying security solutions and attacks. It should
not limit the designer to a predened xed set of security concerns.
Modularity. The model should support expressing complex and
large systems by composing elements into larger solutions. This
is enabled in the proposed meta-model by using the composite
pattern [7]. Besides constructing more complex solutions, the model
should also be modular in supporting representations at varying
levels of abstraction. In other words, the model should not force or
limit the designer to work on a single level of abstraction. Since the
details of a specic security solution are important to its correctness,
the meta-model should support the inclusion of all the lower-level
details into the model.
Figure 1 shows the structure of the proposed meta-model. This
structure of the meta-model is layered, of which each layer uses and
builds on top of the previous layers. The rest of this section presents
each of these layers in turn, enriched with examples, including
security mechanisms and attacks.
2.1 Core Layer
The core meta-model layer contains a very small set of meta-model
classes, encapsulating shared properties of all meta-model classes
such as a name attribute. This layer is not very interesting by itself.
2.2 Information Layer
The Information layer is an essential layer of the security meta-
model. Information is the main asset used in many software systems
and processing information is one of the core responsibilities of
software systems. Therefore, securing these software systems re-
quires placing additional constraints on the information processing,
i.e., controlling what is processed when, how, and by whom.
Figure 2: Information layer
The Information layer contains classes to generically represent
information and its meta-data, and is (partially) displayed in Fig-
ure 2. Object is a generic representation for something which can
have meta-data associated with it. A Meta-data instance is used to
link the actual meta-data to the object, by linking to the type of
meta-data (Attribute) and the value (Information). Both Meta-data
and Attribute are themselves specializations of Information, which
in turn is a specialization of Object, so they can all have meta-data
associated with them as well. This meta-model layer also allows the
construction of more complex Information-structures such as, for
example, lists (associating each entry with its index via meta-data).
Example: Meta-data and nested meta-data. As an illustration of
how Meta-data is associated with Objects, consider the example of a
person (Object) with an age (Attribute) of 50 years (Information), as
shown in Figure 3. Note how the Information object that represents
the age value has its own Meta-data, which distinguishes the value
(50) from the unit (years).
Figure 3: Example of meta-data and nested meta-data
Example: Cryptographic key. The classes from the Information
layer can also be used to represent cryptographic keys. In this
representation, there is a cryptoKey object which has the meta-data
associated with it for the key’s properties. This can include elements
such as the key size, the algorithm, an identier, etc.
2.3 Identity Layer
A second important layer for modelling security is the Identity
layer. Identities are required for distinguishing between dierent
entities interacting with a system, which can be human users as
well as other systems. When devices and services can have more
than one user, it becomes more important to be able to distinguish
between them. The need for identities and verifying these identities
is also apparent in the real world, where many interactions with
A Modular Meta-model for Security Solutions Programming ’17, April 03-06, 2017, Brussels, Belgium
Figure 4: Identity layer
companies or government agencies require some form of identity
information to be veried.
The Identity layer contains the classes for representing identi-
ties (Figure 4). There is one root class Identity, and three specializa-
tions of this class. An instance of any of the Identity classes contains
attributes with information about the entity to which it belongs.
For example, for a human user, this could include the user’s real
name, address, usernames and passwords on various websites, or
iris pattern. For a server, this could be the IP address, the physical lo-
cation, hostname, or security certicate, for instance. ActualIdentity
is used to represent one unique identity of an entity in the model,
representing the ‘true’ identity of the entity. The ClaimedIdentity
is used to communicate identity information to other entities. To
this end, it may or may not contain information of ActualIdentity
(e.g., consider a stolen identity document). The third specialization,
Principal, represents how knowledge about some identity is stored
by someone else. An example of this is storing identity information
in a user database.
Example: Authentication. In this example, we show how the
model can be used to express authentication and potential attacks
on authentication mechanisms.
Authentication consists of two steps: identication and veri-
cation. Firstly, the entity that needs to be authenticated identies
itself by providing identity information in a ClaimedIdentity. Next,
in the verication step, the authenticator needs to verify the in-
formation in the ClaimedIdentity against the known information
(i.e., the Principal). We illustrate an authentication procedure in
detail with the following list of steps. The identities1 in these steps
use the following super- and subscripts:X@storedAtsubject,creator/modif ier .
The creator/modier can be omitted if it is the same as the subject.
Note that these subscripts are only used in the example to distin-
guish between dierent instances of the Identity class. They do
not reect attributes or associations contained in the meta-model
itself, although some of the information that they convey could be
associated with the identities as meta-data.
(1) The user (AIuser ) wants to visit a website (AIwebsite ).
(2) The user types the URL in the browser as (s)he remembers
it (P@userwebsite,user )
(3) The user is (hopefully) connected to the correct website
(AIwebsite ), but the user can only verify this using the
1AI: ActualIdentity, CI: ClaimedIdentity, P: Principal
information received over the connection (CIwebsite,x ,
where x can be the website or an attacker)
(4) The user provides her/his credentials (CIuser ) to the web-
site.
(5) The system receives login information (CIuser ). Depending
on security mechanisms in place, the system may receive
modied (CIuser,attacker ) information (e.g., attacker in
the middle).
(6) The system checks if the information (CIuser ) received cor-
responds with the known account details (P@websiteuser,website ).
That last step reveals how authentication can be modelled. Suc-
cessful authentication occurs when the system can conrm that the
ClaimedIdentity corresponds with the known Principal: CIuser,x ∼
P@serveruser,server . Failed authentication is the opposite, i.e. CIuser,x 
P@serveruser,server .
Spoong also ts in this model. In case of a successful spoof-
ing attack, an adversary can construct a ClaimedIdentity which
closely resembles the user’s own one (CIuser ≈ CIuser,attacker )
and that matches with the Principal (P@websiteuser,website ) known by
the website. The problem is of course that the ClaimedIdentity
does not correspond with the ActualIdentity: CIuser ∼ AIuser but
CIuser,attacker  AIuser .
Similarly, spoong of the server can also be represented. In
this case, the attacker fabricates the ClaimedIdentity of the server
CIserver,attacker ≈ CIserver , thereby tricking the user into think-
ing (s)he is communicating with the server (AIserver ) while in
reality communicating with the attacker (AIattacker ).
2.4 Actor Layer
Figure 5: Actor layer
The classes from the Actor meta-model layer are used to repre-
sent any entity in the system that performs actions (e.g., running
code, communicating). Figure 5 shows the actor classes. This layer
contains the Actor class, which is specialized into a Person and a
System class. The System class supports recursive decomposition, so
more complex System structures can be modelled, and the system
can be represented at multiple levels of abstractions by decompos-
ing it into the underlying and interacting elements. For example, a
server Actor can be decomposed into a web server and operating
system actor when this level of detail is required. Additionally, ev-
ery Actor is also associated with an ActualIdentity representing the
‘true’ identity of the Actor .
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Example: Phishing. Phishing also includes the concepts from the
Identity-layer. In a phishing attack, an adversary sends a Claime-
dIdentity (CIwebsite,phisher ) to the end-user, which contains at-
tributes that look very similar to those of the ActualIdentity of the
Actor being spoofed. E.g., a ClaimedIdentity with the following
URL https://www.paypaI.com is sent to the user. In this exam-
ple, the inaccurate manual verication step of the human end-user
(Person) is exploited or the fact the UI of the browser (System) of
the end-user does not make a visual distinction between an lower-
case ` and a capital I . To counter this threat, additional security
mechanisms can be introduced which are modelled as follows. The
ClaimedIdentity of the phisher will contain the misleading URL
CIwebsite,phisher {url(..)}. To make such a successful attack more
dicult, the System will include additional information which is
hard to fabricate (e.g., certicate with organizational information):
CIwebsite {url(..); certicate(url ,OrдanizationName)}. This infor-
mation is used by the browser (System) and is displayed to the
user (Person) to avoid confusion. This happens by, for example,
adding the green address bar for extended validation certicates
and displaying the organization name next to the website address.
2.5 Communication Layer
This layer links to the Actor, Identity and Information layers
discussed above. The Communication-layer provides classes for
modelling communication of varying complexity between Actors,
and this on varying levels of abstraction. There are three main
groups of communication modelling elements: (i) representing the
communication channels themselves (Channel, Port, Interface),
(ii) representing how communication happens over those channels
(InstructionSet, TransmissionContext, Transmission, Com-
munication, Session), and (iii) representing how communica-
tion channels can be decomposed into the underlying channels
on lower levels of abstraction (InterfaceConcretization, Chan-
nelConcretization, InterfaceLink, PortLink). The classes for
modelling channels (i) and their concretization (iii) are displayed in
Figure 6, while the classes for modelling the communication over
these channels (ii) are displayed in Figure 7.
For the representation of communication channels (i), three el-
ements are used. Channel represents the communication link be-
tween two interacting Actors. To interact with the communication
Channel, actors can control or observe an Interface (or both), which
is tied to a channel via a Port.
To communicate Information over this channel, each Interface
has an InstructionSet associated with it, which expresses how the
Interface can be used to send Information over the Channel. Each
Transmission over the channel links a TransmissionContext at the
sending side with one at the receiving side. The TransmissionCon-
text links to the actual message that is sent or received, expressed in
the InstructionSet of respectively the sending or receiving Interface.
The separate representation of both the sent and received message
enables modelling modications of transmissions (e.g., by an inter-
mediary such as a router or an attacker). Above the Transmission
and TransmissionContext are Communication and Session, which
enable modelling more complex communications such as the run
of a protocol.
Figure 6: Communication layer: Communication channel
and concretization elements
Figure 7: Communication layer: Communication transmis-
sion elements
Finally, the communication-layer also contains classes for mod-
elling the concrete details underlying a Channel (iii). This is done by
using a ChannelConcretization. The ChannelConcretization links the
Ports of the Channel being rened, to the Ports of the underlying
Channels. This expresses how the combination of the underlying
Channels forms the original Channel. Similar to the concretization
of Channels, the Interfaces are concretized as well. For linking the
Interfaces, an InterfaceConcretization is added which links the high-
level Interface with the lower-level Interface. By making this link
explicit, the InterfaceConcretization can also be associated with the
algorithms necessary for translating communication in the high-
level InstructionSet to communication in the low-level InstructionSet,
there by making explicit how high-level communication is trans-
formed to low-level messages. This way of modelling enables the
inclusion of actual protocols in the model, they are represented as
a combination of algorithms, which are included explicitly in the
model at both ends of the communication.
Example: Man-in-the-Middle. An example of a type of attack that
can be modelled using the communication classes is a man-in-the-
middle attack. The elements for representing Channels can be used
to explicitly model what happens on the channels underneath it.
For example, the entire TCP/IP stack can be modelled by breaking
down the channel in each layer into the underlying elements. This
enables modelling man-in-the-middle attacks, but also any Actors
in between communicating Actors that perform some functionality.
An example of this is when Network Address Translation is used.
Especially when conducting security analyses, taking the com-
plete picture into account, including all underlying layers, is neces-
sary to make proper statements with regard to the security of the
overall solution. This is the security version of the end-to-end ar-
gument, which has already been discussed extensively before [11].
Example: Side-channel. The proposed communication classes
can also be used to model side-channel attacks. All communication
between Actors happens over channels, and any interaction from
an Actor with a Channel happens through an Interface. Therefore,
a side-channel can be modelled as an additional Interface which
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allows an adversary to observe the communication over theChannel.
This Interface can have a completely dierent InstructionSet. E.g.,
measuring the current in a wire.
Example: Protections oered by lower layers. Finally, the mod-
elling of ChannelConcretizations enables the explicit inclusion of
dependencies on mechanisms applied in lower-level Channels. Con-
sider, for example, authentication via a username and password
combination. This security mechanism relies on properly verifying
these user credentials at the receiving end of the channel. But, in
addition to this security check, the mechanism also strongly relies
on the condentiality of these credentials. To realize this protec-
tion, websites often rely on a SSL/TLS channel below the HTTP
channel. Such a critical requirement on another underlying security
mechanism can be made explicit in this model.
3 RELATEDWORK
Van den Berghe et al. [15] conducted a systematic literature survey
on representations for security. They identied a major gap in the
support for several dierent security concerns, with several repre-
sentations focusing on only a single concern. Nguyen et al. [10] did
survey on model-driven development for secure systems. The re-
sults for model-driven security conrm the above results, with very
few approaches supporting multiple security concerns. Addition-
ally, interactions between security concerns are often overlooked.
Uzunov et al. [14] conducted a more broadly scoped survey on
approaches combining security and software engineering. They
conclude there is no ideal methodology that satised all their crite-
ria. Their survey also conrms the lack of support for a wide range
of security solutions.
Because of the large amount of dierent security representations,
we limit ourselves to a discussion of a few important examples of
existing representations. UMLsec [9] oers UML prole for includ-
ing security information and makes extensive use of stereotypes
and tagged values to represent this information. It is geared to-
wards automated verication, and thus focusses on a lower level of
abstraction. Another representation is SecureUML [2] for model-
driven security. In SecureUML a combination is made of modelling
languages (e.g., UML) and security language (e.g., an RBAC repre-
sentation) to formalize access control requirements and generate
the necessary infrastructure. Illustrating a scoped focus on a specic
security concern.
Finally, Bau and Mitchell [4] elaborated on the need for a uniform
conceptual framework for expressing systems, threats, and security
properties. The framework still targets a low level of abstraction,
as it is used for protocol analysis.
4 FUTUREWORK
The parts of the meta-model presented above form the structure of
the system to which security mechanisms are to be applied. In this
section we list a selection of future extensions to the meta-model.
The current meta-model classes oer a solid base for expressing
a wide range of security mechanisms in its models. In the next
steps, we want to leverage this model for expressing common se-
curity mechanisms in a reusable way, including the links of these
mechanisms to the dierent system model elements that they use
or interact with, the explicit dependencies on other security mech-
anisms, and assumptions of these mechanisms on other elements
of the model (e.g., underlying condential channel).
Besides, the extension mechanisms for the representation of se-
curity mechanisms and their interaction with the system model
elements, there are also opportunities for providing a library of
system representations that can be reused. Examples of this are:
the standard TCP/IP network stack, the HTTP and SSL/TLS combi-
nation, and common platforms or frameworks. Common systems
can then be readily reused and do not need to be remodelled.
5 CONCLUSION
In order to provide a comprehensive security model, support is
needed for (i) an extensive set of building blocks for constructing
security solutions, (ii) support for composing and decomposing
more complex security solutions, and support for renement by
representing the details and inner workings of a solution on a lower
abstraction level. Currently, many representations lack support for
multiple security mechanisms. Additionally, existing solutions have
only limited support for composition and renement.
In this paper, we introduced a meta-model which supports mod-
elling a variety of security mechanisms and attacks, and in addition
supports composition of more complex solutions and renement
into lower levels of abstractions for working out the details. The
proposal is to serve as a stepping stone for a more detailed and ex-
tensive security model in support of a security-by-design approach.
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